This study utilizes data for 144 countries from 1991-2010 to present the first international estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of road fatalities. We instrument each country's gasoline price with that country's oil reserves and the yearly international crude oil price to address potential endogeneity concerns. Our findings suggest that the average reduction in road fatalities resulting from a 10% increase in the gasoline pump price is in the order of 3-6%. Around 35,000 deaths per year could be avoided by the removal of global fuel subsidies.
I. INTRODUCTION
While a negative impact of gasoline prices on road fatalities has been documented for the United States (US), there is limited international evidence on whether road death rates are higher in countries with lower gasoline prices. In this study we employ data for a panel of 144 countries during 1991-2010 to present international estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of road fatalities. To address the potential endogeneity of gasoline prices we use each country's underground oil reserves and the international crude oil price as instruments for that country's gasoline price. We find that the mean long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths is in the order of -0.3 to -0.6, and that around 35,000 lives could be saved on roads each year by phasing out global fuel subsidies. We also use our results to estimate the number of road deaths that could be avoided on US roads by an increase in fuel taxes.
Road safety is a leading public health issue. Road crashes are the cause of 1.3 million deaths every year, making them the ninth-leading cause of death globally and the number one cause of death for people between 15 and 29 years of age (data for 2011; World Health Organization [WHO] 2013a). Road death rates are particularly high in middle-and lowincome countries, which each year see an average of 20 and 18 deaths per 100,000 population, respectively. There are around 9 road deaths per 100,000 population each year in high-income countries. Up to 50 million people worldwide also suffer non-fatal injuries each year, which carries large human and financial costs. The global road death toll is expected to increase to around 2.4 million per year by 2030 in a business-as-usual scenario, becoming the fifth-leading cause of death (WHO 2013b) . From an international perspective, finding ways to reduce road deaths is becoming an increasingly important policy imperative.
A negative relationship between the gasoline pump price (in US cents) and annual road deaths per 100,000 population for a large cross-section of countries in 2010 is presented in Figure 1 . Countries with low gasoline prices, such as Venezuela and Iran, have among the highest road death rates, whereas road deaths tend to be less frequent in high-price countries.
Figure 1 also demonstrates substantial variation in road fatality rates among countries with similar gasoline prices. A number of additional variables, including per capita incomes and road infrastructure, will be considered in explaining this variation.
-Figure 1-
The large cross-country variation in retail prices for gasoline -a tradable commodity -exists primarily because of differences in tax and subsidy policies. Venezuela had the lowest average price of gasoline in 2010: just 2 US cents per liter. Venezuela's gasoline price is substantially below the international price for crude oil (51 cents per liter in 2010; GIZ 2012), and so involves a large subsidy for consumers. In contrast, some governments impose high taxes on gasoline which result in high retail pump prices. In Turkey, for instance, the average gasoline pump price was 252 US cents per liter in 2010, including 139 cents of taxes (International Energy Agency [IEA] 
2013a).
It is likely that the principal channel via which higher gasoline prices may reduce road deaths is a reduction in the distance travelled in motor vehicles as people substitute away from using a more expensive commodity. Reduced driving decreases the exposure of both vehicle occupants and others to road crashes. Reductions in distance travelled may be a result of people transitioning to less transport-intensive activities, alternative transport options, and closer workplaces. Some of these responses take time to implement, so the long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths is likely to exceed the short-run elasticity.
In addition to reducing distance travelled, higher gasoline prices might also lead to a reduction in the number of road deaths per kilometer driven. One reason is that, to conserve fuel, drivers might reduce high-speed driving and also their rates of acceleration and braking.
1 A reduction in the number of road crashes per kilometer travelled might also occur because high-risk drivers, including the young, the old, and those taking leisure-related trips, are particularly sensitive to gasoline prices (Grabowski and Morrisey 2004; Cullotta 2008; Morrisey and Grabowski 2011) . Higher gasoline prices also result in substitution from heavier to lighter, more fuel-efficient, vehicles (e.g. light trucks to automobiles), and there is evidence that lighter vehicles are associated with a lower overall number of road deaths per kilometer travelled (Gayer 2004; White 2004 ).
There are also ways in which higher gasoline prices might actually lead to more rather than fewer road deaths. One is: by reducing congestion, higher gasoline prices can allow drivers to travel at higher speeds (Burger and Kaffine 2009) , which increases the risk of fatal crashes.
Substitution to particularly risky types of fuel-efficient vehicles, such as motorcycles, may also be an important cause of additional road deaths when gasoline prices rise (Hyatt et al. 2009; Wilson et al. 2009 ).
1 Speeds over 80 kilometers per hour are generally associated with lower fuel efficiency (U.S. Office (2008) reports that higher gasoline prices indeed cause drivers on uncongested Californian roads to slightly reduce their speeds.
Department of Energy 2013). The Congressional Budget
Existing evidence for the US indicates that higher gasoline prices reduce the total number of road fatalities and/or crashes (Leigh and Wilkinson 1991; Haughton and Sarkar 1996; Morrisey 2004, 2006; Sivak 2009; Chi et al. 2010 Chi et al. , 2011 Chi et al. , 2012 Chi et al. , 2013a Chi et al. , 2013b Montour 2011) . As for gasoline demand itself, the response of road deaths to gasoline prices in the US is inelastic. Grabowski and Morrisey (2004) countries which shows a negative association between average gasoline prices and traffic fatality rates. As far as we are aware, there has been no prior international estimate of the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths.
II. APPROACH
We estimate the following specification:
(1)
where D is road deaths in country c in year t, G is the gasoline price in year-2010 US cents, Y is gross domestic product (GDP) in real purchasing power parity-adjusted US dollars, P is population, and X is a vector of additional controls included in later estimations.  c and  t are country and year fixed effects, and  is an error term. We also present specifications that control for country-specific time trends.
Our primary interest is in identifying the long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths. To this end we initially estimate Equation (1) for a cross-section of countries in the year 2010, as between variation has a natural long-run interpretation. We then proceed to panel estimates using the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), between, and fixed effects estimators. The between estimator uses average data for each country and provides estimates of long-run effects (Baltagi and Griffin 1983, 1984; Pesaran and Smith 1995; Pirotte 1999 Pirotte , 2003 Baltagi 2008; Stern 2010 An issue of concern is that the gasoline price term in Equation (1) may be correlated with the error term. The level of demand for road transport might have a material effect on a country's average gasoline pump price, for instance, while also affecting road deaths Morrisey 2004, 2006; Morrisey and Grabowski 2011) . Alternatively, governments may impose higher gasoline taxes in countries with low demand for road use, as argued by Hammar et al. (2004) . Perhaps even more importantly, there might be omitted policy variables that are associated with gasoline prices: countries with higher gasoline taxes might 2 Negative binomial models are often used in studies of road deaths (see, for instance, the papers of Chi et al.) . We focus initially on linear models (in log-log form) because these are more common in an instrumental variable context. As will be documented, negative binomial models provide long-run gasoline price elasticities of road deaths that fall within our reported range.
also have stricter road rules, for instance. These endogeneity concerns mean that we cannot be sure that single-equation estimation of Equation (1) will produce unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths.
To address these potential endogeneity concerns we present estimates using the two supplyside instruments for the gasoline price employed by Burke and Nishitateno (2013) in their recent study of the gasoline price elasticity of demand. The first is a country's per capita underground oil reserves, as oil-rich countries such as Venezuela are more likely to subsidize gasoline and oil-poor countries such as the Republic of Korea are more likely to tax it. The second is a measure of the annual average international crude oil price, as higher crude oil prices flow through to higher gasoline pump prices in most countries. It is likely that our instruments affect road deaths via gasoline prices rather than other channels, and we obtain similar results in specifications with a variety of controls. The advantage of using two instruments is that doing so allows verification of the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths using independent sources of variation in gasoline prices. In addition to using the instruments separately we also present estimates using both instruments together. Existing studies on the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths in the US do not use instrumental variable ( as used in Figure 1 , provide similar results. We focus on fatalities because international data on non-fatal road crashes are less reliable (Luoma and Sivak 2007; Sauerzapf et al. 2010; WHO 2013b) . Nevertheless, the accuracy of the data on road deaths is likely to vary substantially. If the reporting of road deaths improves in a way that is correlated with economic development, our GDP variable will control for some data quality differences.
Because of missing data, on average each country is included in our sample for 5.8 of the ten years. The countries in our sample represented 94% of the world's population in 2010. A full list of data sources is in the Appendix.
III. RESULTS

A. Main Specifications
Our main results, controlling for GDP and population, are presented in Table 1 . Column 1 is for a year-2010 cross-section of countries, and indicates that a 1% higher gasoline price on average reduces road fatalities by 0.4%. Cross-sectional estimates utilize only between variation, and so this is a first estimate of the long-run effect of gasoline prices on road deaths. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 present results using the pooled OLS (with year dummies) and between estimators. The point estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths are slightly smaller (-0.3), but remain distinguishable from zero at the 1% significance level.
- Table 1 -Column 4 of Table 1 controls for both year and country fixed effects, which removes most of the variation in gasoline prices in our sample. 4 This makes it difficult for within-country gasoline price movements to affect road deaths. Static models relying on only within variation are also likely to provide short-run effects because of the under-specification of dynamics (Baltagi 2008) . Likely as a result of these factors, the fixed effects estimate in column 4 is insignificant. We obtain a significant coefficient in the fixed-effects specification in column 5 which includes a time trend for each country in the sample.
Columns 6-10 of Table 1 show our IV results. Our cross-sectional and panel estimates instrumenting with per capita oil reserves (columns 6-7) indicate that higher gasoline prices significantly reduce the number of road deaths, with the cross-sectional estimate providing an elasticity of -0.3. Our identification strategy prevents us from controlling for country fixed effects when instrumenting with oil reserves per capita as there is almost no useful timeseries variation in per capita oil reserves. Columns 8 and 9 instrument with the log real international crude oil price. The country-specific linear time trends are included instead of year dummies, as year dummies would be perfectly collinear with our instrument. The gasoline price elasticities in these estimates are -0.5 and -0.4. It is reassuring that we obtain quite similar results using different instruments. Column 10 uses both instruments and obtains a gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.5. Stock and Yogo (2005) tests indicate that our instruments provide adequate identification strength. Specifically, the null hypothesis of 15% maximal IV size is rejected in each of the IV specifications. The first-stage coefficients, as expected, indicate that oil reserves and the oil price are negatively and positively correlated with the gasoline price, respectively. The 4 A regression of log gasoline price on country and year dummies has an R 2 of 0.90.
first stage in column 10 shows that the partial effect of a 1% increase in the real world oil price is on average a 0.3% increase in the domestic gasoline price. Having an additional tonne of in-ground oil reserves per capita on average reduces the local gasoline price by 0.07%. An overidentification test in column 10 does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The single-equation and IV results are similar to one another when instrumenting with oil reserves per capita (columns 6-7), meaning that endogeneity tests fail to reject the null that the log gasoline price is exogenous in these specifications. 5 In contrast, endogeneity tests in columns 8-10 suggest that there is due cause to treat gasoline prices as endogenous.
In unreported specifications, we obtain similar IV results controlling for any of the additional potential determinants of road deaths that will be considered in Table 3 . The robustness of our IV estimates to the addition of controls such as road infrastructure variables reduces the concern that they result from a violation of the IV exclusion restriction.
The estimated coefficients for the control variables in Table 1 obtained by Burke and Nishitateno (2013) , likely because richer countries dedicate more resources to improving road safety. A non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and road deaths will be considered in coming specifications. Table 2 shows estimates for a distributed lag model with country and year fixed effects.
Because these rely solely on within variation, we commence the gasoline price terms from year t-1 to allow time for responses to November prices. As a result, our estimation sample here extends to 2009 rather than 2010. Lags are included for every second year given the biennial nature of GIZ's gasoline price data, and the sample reduces with each additional lag.
The long-run gasoline price elasticity is the sum of the coefficients for each gasoline price term.
- Table 2- The results in Table 2 provide an estimate of the long-run gasoline price elasticity of -0.6 when lags to year t-9 are considered (significant at the 10% level). The largest effect of gasoline prices on road deaths occurs after 5-7 years. Similar, and statistically stronger, longrun multipliers are obtained in pooled OLS and between estimates of distributed lag models.
We also find generally similar estimates in specifications with country-specific time trends (see base of Table 2 ). We cannot rule out that even larger elasticities may be obtained from distributed lag models once additional time-series data are available.
Based on our single-equation and IV estimates using between variation in Table 1 and our estimates using distributed lags in Table 2 , we conclude that the average long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths is likely in the order of -0.3 to -0.6. Burke and Nishitateno (2013) obtained similar estimates of the long-run gasoline price elasticity of demand. We do not have sufficient data for our international sample to decompose the effects of gasoline prices on road deaths into specific channels such as distance travelled or travel speeds.
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B. Robustness
In some countries a large share of the vehicle fleet runs on diesel rather than gasoline. Table 3 presents estimates using the average of the gasoline and diesel prices and controlling for additional variables: land area, the length of each country's road network, the share of roads that is paved, the vehicle and motorcycle stocks, measures of the importance of rail and air transport, the share of the population aged 15-24 (who are typically overrepresented in road crashes), the urban population share, alcohol consumption, blood alcohol limits for drivers, measures of the rule of law and control of corruption, economic growth, and infant mortality.
Controlling for road infrastructure variables helps to address the concern that our main result operates via the additional road funding that is possible when gasoline taxes are high. The log infant mortality rate is included as a proxy of overall health conditions in each country (noting that few infant deaths are caused by road crashes). We show between estimates for static models given our desires to estimate long-run effects and maximize sample size.
- Table 3 -
The results in Table 3 provide gasoline price elasticities of road deaths of -0.3 to -0.5 (significant at the 1% level), suggesting that fuel prices are one of the most robust cross- 6 The International Road Federation (2012) and OECD (2013a) provide some international data on vehicle or passenger kilometers travelled, but these are unavailable for the majority of our sample and are of questionable quality. The OECD (2013b) notes that there is no common international method for calculating passenger distance travelled in road vehicles.
country determinants of road deaths. Interestingly, countries with better "rule of law" ratings have more road deaths, perhaps because reporting is more complete. Countries with better control of corruption and lower alcohol consumption have fewer road deaths (see also Law et al. 2011 ). The effect of gasoline prices on road deaths may operate via some of the control variables in Table 3 , including GDP. We obtain similar estimates for the gasoline price term if the full set of controls is lagged, however. Pooled OLS estimates also provide similar results (although with slightly smaller point estimates of the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths). Table 4 presents results using per capita measures of road deaths and GDP, and controlling for population density instead of population. The Table also shows estimates for (a) subsamples of OECD and non-OECD countries, (b) an estimate controlling for regional dummies, and (c) estimates of negative binomial models, which are well suited to a count dependent variable. 7 Column 1 provides a similar result to Table 1, confirming that it makes little difference if variables are in level or per capita terms. Column 2 controls for the square of log GDP per capita to account for the road deaths Kuznets curve (see, for instance, Law et al. 2011 ). The results suggest that the road death rate increases until a mid-range GDP per capita, and then subsequently falls. We continue to observe a negative and statistically significant gasoline price elasticity of road deaths.
- Table 4- 7 Negative binomial models are preferred over Poisson models because our road death data exhibit overdispersion (variance exceeds the mean).
Column 3 of Table 4 includes the squared log gasoline price to test whether the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths varies at different gasoline price levels. Road deaths appear to be more responsive to changes in the gasoline price when the price is already high. The estimated gasoline price elasticity of road deaths at the 25 th -percentile gasoline price is -0.5, increasing to -0.8 at the 75 th percentile. 8 Column 4 includes an interaction term between the log gasoline price and log GDP per capita. The results provide no evidence that the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths varies by development level. We also obtain statistically significant estimates of the effect of gasoline prices on road deaths for sub-sets of OECD and non-OECD countries (columns 5 and 6). 9 Reported data on road fatalities are likely to be more reliable for OECD countries, and so the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.5
for OECD countries increases our confidence in the main results. Column 7 controls for regional dummy variables, which allow some time-invariant differences in factors such as driving culture to be considered. The results are similar.
Columns 8-10 of Table 4 present cross-section, pooled and fixed-effect negative binomial estimates for a specification including squared log GDP per capita. The coefficients for the gasoline price, which can again be interpreted as elasticities, are significantly different from zero, and range from -0.4 (using between variation in the cross-sectional estimate) to -0.2 (using static within variation). An unreported fixed-effect negative binomial model with additional lags provides a long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.6 (significant at the 5% level). In an additional check -available on request -we also estimated an IV negative binomial model, obtaining similar results to our linear IV estimates (but for which 8 In unreported specifications we find that the gasoline price elasticity of road deaths is similar in magnitude for large or small changes in two-year gasoline prices. 9 The OECD sub-sample includes all 34 current member countries.
weak instrument test and other information is not available). In short, results using negative binominal models fall within our reported range.
A lingering concern for some readers may be that additional time-varying policies affecting road deaths are difficult to control for, and may be correlated with gasoline prices. It is not possible to control for all such variables (although we note that our specifications generally have relatively high R 2 values). Omitted variables could only be causing a serious identification problem if they are correlated with gasoline prices (in our single-equation estimates) and both of our instruments (in our IV estimates), which is unlikely. The world oil price is unlikely to be affected by or have any short-term influence on policies related to driver licensing or drink-driving limits in any specific country, for instance. Our IV strategy, together with our use of numerous controls (alcohol consumption; country fixed effects;
country-by-country time trends, regional dummies; etc), make us confident that our results represent consistent estimates of the causal effect of gasoline prices on road deaths.
IV. ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF AVOIDED DEATHS FROM FUEL PRICE REFORM
Some countries, particularly the oil-rich, provide large price subsidies to consumers of gasoline. Table 5 presents estimates of the number of road deaths that could be avoided if all countries with gasoline prices lower than those in the US (76 cents per liter in 2010)
increased their average gasoline price to the US level. The estimates are based on a conservative long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.4 (e.g. column 1 of Table   1 ), which we apply to all countries. Like GIZ (2012), we consider the gasoline price in the US -the lowest of all OECD countries -as the divider between countries that subsidize gasoline consumption and those that tax it. While the US does apply state and federal taxes on gasoline, these are considered to be the minimum required to adequately cover road infrastructure and externality costs (GIZ 2012).
- Table 5 -
The results in Table 5 suggest that around 35,000 lives per annum could be saved in 23
countries by removing the subsidies that were in place in 2010. 10 35,000 lives is 3% of the global annual road death toll. The countries in which fuel subsidy reform offers the largest potential reductions in road deaths are Iran (10,600 avoided deaths per year) and Venezuela (>5,000 avoided deaths per year). The removal of fuel subsidies would also result in large reductions in road deaths in Indonesia (4,500), Nigeria (4,200), Saudi Arabia (2,700), Egypt
(1,800), and Algeria (1,700).
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How many road deaths could be avoided if the US itself had higher taxes on gasoline? Our results imply that around 8,500 lives per year could be saved if US gasoline taxes were increased to bring the US gasoline price to the United Kingdom (UK) level (192 cents per liter in 2010), which would reduce US road fatalities by around a quarter. A reduction of this magnitude is not historically infeasible: the number of annual road deaths in the US fell by 9,600 (17%) as gasoline prices spiked during the years 1973-1975, for instance (Leigh and Geraghty 2008) . Annual road deaths in the US also reduced by 9,800 between 2006 and 2010 10 These are ceteris paribus estimates for the year 2010. Population and GDP growth will concurrently place upward pressure on road deaths in most of these countries.
11 Several of the countries listed in Table 5 (e.g. Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria) have reduced gasoline subsidies since 2010. Future researchers might explore the effects of these recent subsidy reductions on road safety.
as gasoline prices increased and the economy entered recession (Sivak and Schoettle 2010) .
Our estimates indicate that the contribution of higher gasoline prices to the reduction in US road deaths over the period 2006-2010 was around 1,300 deaths/year.
How many more road deaths would occur if countries that currently have high gasoline taxes move to US-level gasoline prices? The case of the UK is illustrative. Our estimates indicate that the UK would have around 1,800 additional road deaths per year if it had US-level gasoline prices, which would be a 95% increase over current levels. The UK's road death toll has been falling over recent years; our estimates indicate that moving to US-level prices would return the country to a circa-1995 road death toll.
V. CONCLUSION
This study has utilized the substantial variation in international gasoline pump prices to examine the effect of gasoline prices on the number of people dying in road crashes. Our results indicate that higher gasoline prices significantly reduce the number of road deaths, with our point estimates of the mean long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths lying between -0.3 and -0.6. The elasticity appears to be even larger in countries with high gasoline prices. Our international estimates of the long-run gasoline price elasticity of road deaths are larger than Grabowski and Morrisey's (2004) estimates for the US. fuel subsidies and increases in fuel taxes could, however, make a large contribution to the Plan's objectives. Countries providing the largest fuel subsidies are particularly compelling candidates for reform. Globally, around 35,000 deaths from road crashes could be avoided each year by the removal of the fuel subsidies that were in place in 2010. Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10%. Standard errors in columns 8-10 are robust and clustered at the country level. Column 10 results obtained by including country dummies in a negative binomial estimation. The dependent variable in the negative binomial models is not logged. Coefficients on constants not reported. The regional dummies are based on the seven World Bank (2013a) regions. Column 5 estimates use a gasoline price elasticity of road deaths of -0.4 and are rounded to the nearest hundred if >1,000. Estimates are capped at ">5,000" for Venezuela given the imprecision associated with estimates using such large proportional price changes.
Regression estimates use IRF reported road death data rather than the WHO death estimates. The WHO data are their estimates. These data are shown in this Table because they provide superior country coverage in 2010 (only).
